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Abstract 
In this paper we present results from an extensive survey of United Kingdom 
(UK) university academics investigating satisfaction with senior managers and 
university governance: the Senior Management Survey (SMS). 5,888 
academic staff across the United Kingdom Higher Education (HE) sector 
completed the survey, and results were used to construct a league table of 
staff satisfaction with management. This table is a stark indictment of the 
current state of the UK HE sector, showing a mean satisfaction score of 
10.54%. The SMS also collected qualitative data, and we extend the league 
table’s insights using this data. Thematic analysis revealed seven major 
themes: the dominance and brutality of metrics; excessive workload; 
governance and accountability; perpetual change; vanity projects; the 
silenced academic; work and mental health. We conclude with a discussion of 
how this statactivist research can be used to bring about change in 
management and governance of UK HE.  
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Introduction 
Universities occupy a curious position in United Kingdom (UK) society; 
both of the state and separate from it, public institutions yet private 
enterprises, sites of learning and change but also places of tradition and ritual. 
We tell ourselves a mythical story of the university in our society; that it has a 
tradition dating back centuries, that it transformed itself into a modern, cutting 
edge knowledge generating institution, that it is a site of academic freedom 
and creative expression for students (Wallerstein 2006; Docherty 2015). 
Although some aspects of the story are mythic, many commentators identify a 
stated purpose that is shared across universities in the UK: universities do 
generate knowledge, do avow to promote academic freedom and they do 
profess to promote creativity in a community of scholars (Barnett 2003; Collini 
2012; Docherty 2015; Smyth 2017). Indeed, the idea of a university as a 
community of scholars is still widely held in UK Higher Education (HE) 
(Docherty 2015: 23), and those who consider themselves to be members of 
such a community of scholars will cleave to the purpose of the university.  
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However, the purpose of a university education has recently shifted from 
something concerned with individual development, critical thinking, and for 
broader societal benefits, to an understanding of a university education being 
assessed as worthwhile on the simple equation of degree cost against post-
graduate employability (Fotiadou, 2018). In addition, it has become 
increasingly clear in recent years that universities are not simply self-
managed communities of scholars, as our mythic history suggests, but are 
riven by a very deep division between senior managers in UK HE and 
academic staff (Barnett 2003; Collini 2012; Docherty 2015). This division, it 
can be argued, has always existed, even in medieval times, but it is clear from 
a review of recent writings on universities in the UK (e.g. Nash, 2019), and 
also from the survey results presented here, that institutional changes at a 
local level, and changes to UK HE at a national level, have deepened and 
widened this division very considerably.  
In this paper we will focus on this division between senior managers and 
academic staff in UK HE institutions by investigating academic staff and their 
perceptions of senior managers in their institution. Using a ‘statactivist’ 
approach we designed and deployed a research instrument to appraise 
universities’ senior managers performance in a HE system that has become 
increasingly characterised by its managerial audit culture. Rather than an 
operational survey that investigates staff ‘engagement’ or measures individual 
or collective performance against KPIs, this research focuses on HE staff 
members’ perception of their working conditions, managerial practices and 
wellbeing.  Here we contribute to the growing body of literature by offering an 
account of our context-dependent research which responds to, and critically 
engages with, the audit culture and new management practices of UK HE. For 
this reason, we will start with a review of recent literature to help contextualise 
the current state of UK HE.  
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The current state of UK HE 
Recent literature documenting the current state of UK HE appears to 
point to a sector beset by a range of disparate but related issues. Just a 
cursory glance at some book titles give a flavour of what is happening in UK 
HE: The Assault on Universities (Bailey and Freeman 2011), Universities at 
War (Docherty 2015), The Toxic University (Smyth 2017, Zombie University 
(Murphy 2017) all highlight dramatic, even cataclysmic change and dire 
possible futures for the sector. Gill (2014) describes an increasing reliance 
upon corporate management techniques, the expansion of student numbers 
without an associated expansion of staff, workforce casualisation, increasingly 
unmanageable workloads and a proliferation of audit regimes oriented toward 
problematic notions of accountability as central to recent changes in the 
sector. Outside of HE a sense of disinterest and bewilderment is matched by 
a growing and pervasive sense of crisis and forms of exploitation within (Gill, 
2014).  
While some have critiqued the concept of neoliberalism as vague and 
conceptually overloaded (Downs, 2017), nonetheless it has retained a central 
position in academic accounts that attempt to make sense of the changing 
nature of the sector. Olssen and Peters (2005) and Edmond (2017) among 
others invoke the spectre of neoliberalism as a polity whose hard 
managerialism systematically deconstructs the space through which 
professional autonomy is exercised. This is achieved via the imposition of 
targets, performance criteria and homogenised systems for assessing 
research and teaching performance. Whether or not the ‘neoliberal university’ 
has sufficient analytic purchase beyond its status as a well-worn trope for the 
conspiracy of global capitalism (Downs, 2017) remains to be seen. However, 
it is clear that a radical project, grounded in particular ideas about public 
services and education, has been mobilised in UK HE in recent years.  
The emergence of a neoliberal project inside UK HE coincided with the 
dramatic expansion of the UK HE sector in the early 1990s, when 
polytechnics were granted university status, coupled with the Labour 
government’s aspiration for 50% of school leavers to go on to Higher 
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Education. The number of HE providers doubled at a stroke in 1992, and 
there are now 160 HE providers in the UK. In the period 1994 to 2017 the 
number of university students rose from 1,231,988 to 1,766,2852. The Higher 
Education Initial Participation Rate (HEIPR) for 20016-17 was 49.8%3. 
The expansion of UK HE from 1992 coincided with the introduction of a 
significant performance measure, the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). 
Now formally called the Research Excellence Framework (REF) the REF 
represents a formal and external assessment of the quality and impact of 
academic’s research, largely through peer grading of publications4. The RAE, 
and now REF, can be seen as the first element of an ever-expanding 
performance audit, evaluation and management culture in UK universities.  
 
The audit mess of UK Higher Education 
Academics are estimated to be one of the most surveilled groups in 
history. Gill (2014) suggests that an academic can now be ranked on more 
than 100 different scales and indices that measure their value. These include 
what Burrows (2012) refers to as ‘metric assemblages’ (such as the REF and 
the Teaching Excellent Framework (TEF)) which take on a life of their own 
and become autonomous actors in the academic world, generating funding, 
 
2 1994-5 HESA figures 946919 FT UG and 285069 PT UG; 2016-17 1766285 
FT and PT UG Source https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-
analysis/students/whos-in-he (accessed 20/05/19) 
3 Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/participation-rates-in-
higher-education-2006-to-2017 (accessed 200519) 
4 Academic communities’ opposition to metric-based assessment regimes is 
not confined to the UK, or to this sort of ‘research selectivity’ exercise. The 
trend towards metric-based evaluation of research quality, and with it the 
‘quality’ of those producing the research is, arguably, endemic across 
academia and across the globe. Opposition to this trend is manifested in local 
struggles against the inclusion of impact factor and citation scores in 
promotion evaluation procedures to national campaigns of opposition to 
exercises such as the REF in the UK, to international campaigns for the 
responsible use of research metrics, with the DORA campaign the most well 
known (https://sfdora.org/).  
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damaging reputations, singling people out for redundancy and closing down 
courses.  
Academic audit has been described as: 
‘an effortful collective outcome of an increasingly centralised and 
elaborated apparatus which becomes intertwined with a range of other 
organisational phenomena, shaping organisational perception, 
governance and strategic mobilisation’ (Power 2015: 50) 
These measurement infrastructures are mobilised to translate ambiguous 
policy objects like ‘impact’ and ‘teaching quality’ into routines capable of 
reproducing themselves. Indeed, such regimes can be profitable, with a high 
quality 4* impact case study worth nearly the equivalent of four high quality 
academic papers, approximately £120,000 (Power, 2015).  
Power (2000) describes how New Performance Management techniques 
have contributed to an ‘audit explosion’ across the public services with 
untested and uncritically implemented regulating systems applied to discipline 
and control doctors, teachers, university lecturers and other professionals. 
This flood of social measures that Power describes as ‘quantifiable 
bureaucratic audits’ have been justified as the necessary tools to ensure 
accountability, transparency and efficiency (Power 2000; Espeland and 
Saunder, 2007).  
This explosion in audit culture has led to a dramatic rise in the amount of 
raw data available to university managers. Finn (2015) suggests that data that 
is wedded to rationalist performance logics allows the emergence of 
sensibilities of progress whereby complex social environments are made 
‘machine readable’. Indeed, the substantial justification for this data 
proliferation has been a perceived need to generate accountability, raise 
standards and increase consumer choice in a post-public HE arena. Here, 
accountability refers to a process of holding actors responsible for their 
actions and by consensus it involves both answerability and enforceability 
(Gaventa and McGee, 2013). However, while absorbing specific 
accountability recipes may be crucial for political and managerialist regimes to 
legitimise behaviour, they do not necessarily bear positively on either 
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standards or democratic answerability (Gulbrandsen, 2008). Instead, audit 
cultures tend to construct a vocabulary of knowledge that legitimises 
managerial power at the expense of more traditional and collegial versions of 
the University (Craig et al 2014).  
Such audits, rankings and league tables have been critiqued for giving 
authority to certain kinds of knowing and judging that decontextualizes and 
simplifies that which it seeks to measure, producing forms of knowledge that 
discourage individuals from noticing how inevitably generative such audit 
quantifications are (Espeland and Saunder, 2007). These depersonalised but 
highly portable numbers have allowed the proliferation of new spaces of 
calculation and new visibilities within which people internal and external to the 
sector can understand ‘worth’ and ‘quality’ (Ball, 2012).  
In such regimes of performativity, experience is nothing and productivity 
is everything – an ever intensifying upward spiral of standards where last 
year’s efforts are a benchmark for improvement (Ball 2012). There is little 
evidence that this metrics explosion in HE improves educational performance, 
with the REF having been described as ‘hallucinatorily wasteful’ (Gill, 2009). 
Moreover, the increased ‘gaming’ of the metrics, the utilitarian model of 
knowledge production that emerges (Ridley, 2017) and the increasing 
desensitisation of academics to their own objectification (Rudd and Goodson, 
2017) has been argued as grounds for approaching these metric 
assemblages with the most profound care (Bal et al 2014).  
Finn (2015) counsels scholars of HE to attune themselves to the 
‘affective atmospheres’ (p4) of data collection regimens in order to understand 
the cultures of education that emerge through contemporary data proliferation. 
Ball (2012) has suggested that the rise of the audit is as much about the 
cultural and economic authority granted to those who call themselves auditors 
as it is about authentic accountability for public spending. Indeed, many have 
pointed the finger at this audit culture as the driving force behind the 
significant increases in volume of teaching, marking and research outputs in 
recent years (Martell, 2017).   
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A question of value concerns the subjects, and indeed, subjectivities that 
routinely emerge from these sets of practices. Metrics perform a powerful 
productive role in the social world by vindicating, limiting, cajoling, legitimising 
and justifying (Beer, 2016, Smyth 2017) where despite feeling neutral and 
objective, they manifestly participate in ‘making people up’ (Hacking 2002), 
changing their behaviours and developing expectations to adapt to the 
systems of measurement that they live within (Espeland and Saunder, 2007). 
Facilitated by a suffocating array of audit assemblages (Spooner, 2017), and 
ignited by an imposed ‘pedagogy of debt’ (Neary and Winn, 2017, p3) it has 
been suggested that we are witnessing a foregrounding of one instrumental 
purpose (skills and employment) over others (education for love, social 
benefit) (Downs, 2017) whereby cultures of audit and measurement are 
grotesquely distorting the very activities that they seek to scrutinise. 
 
Managerial governance 
Even if they were so inclined, the governing bodies of UK HE institutions 
would have great difficulty in challenging university executives. This is partly 
due to government bodies largely consisting of ‘amateurs’ unfamiliar with the 
complex and rapidly changing contours of UK HE operations, finance and 
core business (Ridley, 2017). The 1992 Education Reform Act transferred 
ownership of the old polytechnics from elected local councils to government-
approved governing bodies often with little operational knowledge of HE 
(Rustin, 2016). Senior management teams now appoint self-selecting and 
self-reproducing boards of governors which allow them to exercise largely 
unlimited powers that are endorsed by governing boards, usually after faux 
exercises in consultation (Holmwood et al 2016). Ridley (2017) suggests that 
the system of checks and balances that should underpin good governance in 
universities cannot function, resulting not just in managerial predation but in 
excessive risk taking. In recent years UK HE has witnessed a substantive shift 
in power towards those who revel in the managerialist paradigm.  
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There has been a relative dearth of literature on university senior 
management leadership (Perry and Miller, 2017). However, that which has 
been published has tended to be unequivocal in representing university 
management as sociopathic leaders befuddled by a caustic combination of 
narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Ibid). Craig et al. (2014) 
characterise university senior management regimes as supporting courts of 
conformers and colluders who are selfish, ambitious and openly supportive of 
toxic tyrants where universities, bedevilled by audit culture, are characterised 
as psychotic. Smyth (2017) offers a different negative characterization and 
nomenclature for senior university managers which he describes as ‘zombie 
leadership’, a direct outcome of the application of neoliberal ideology to the 
operation of UK HE (Smyth 2017).  
According to Halffman and Radder (2015), the university has been 
occupied by a ‘mercenary army of professional administrators’ (165) who 
brush aside dissent as the inevitable side effect of progress. They suggest 
that, inherent in the indicator fetishism characterising HE, is a fundamental 
notion that if people are not constantly threatened then they do not do 
enough. Permanent competition under the pretext of quality is, in this 
instance, a manifestation of an organisational mistrust besetting a managerial 
university that cannot judge the intangible notion of ‘excellence’ but believe in 
it nonetheless (Ibid 170).  
There has been a fundamental shift in the past two decades in terms of 
who governs and runs universities. A decline across institutions in terms of 
democratic input and representation regarding university governance has 
been couple to a shift from management by groups of rotated academics to 
management by permanent managers (MacFarlane 2007) whereby this move 
from a collegial to a bureaucratic and hierarchical managerial culture (Rustin, 
2016) has resulted in weakened positions for most staff in HE decision 
making. Holmwood et al (2016) concur with the loss of collective influence of 
academic staff over the direction of UK universities with academics and 
students now party to a hierarchical authority which is as secretive and 
arbitrary as it is ruthless (Gill, 2009). 
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Gill (ibid) notes that the culture of time charts, benchmarks, league 
tables and vision statements has been embedded in the increasingly 
dominant Taylorist models of academic production and assembly to the extent 
that, according to Halffman and Radder (2017, p896), what is at stake is the 
‘very notion of knowledge itself’. Lynch and Ivancheva (2015) suggest that the 
HE elite can, and regularly does, limit academic freedom by under-resourcing 
subjects for teaching and research, disallowing particular disciplines and fields 
of scholarly engagement and/or punishing dissent.  
We can see increasingly depoliticised forms of critical thinking that have 
been integrated into university curricula aimed toward the entrepreneurial 
student (Ridley 2017; Murphy 2017) or what Bal et al (2014) call the 
‘entrepreneurial missteps of the modern university’. Newly hired lecturers are 
now under more pressure to fundraise for research, engage in teaching, 
supervision and administration with lowered salaries and increased 
contractual insecurity (Lynch and Ivancheva, 2015) and a culture of silence 
makes invisible the growing experience of precariousness, pressure and 
exhaustion (Berg et al. 2016). 
 
A statactivist response to the Toxic University 
Recent writings on statistical activism (often truncated to statactivism) in 
France and more distant liberation psychology from Latin America have 
provided an impulse for the research presented her. Montero and Sonn (2009, 
p2) discuss the need to produce a science which is constructed by praxis 
which they define as ‘practice that produces knowledge and knowledge that 
turns into action’. Jiminez-Dominguez (2009) points to the value of Ignacio 
Martin-Baro’s effective use of surveys as de-ideologisation tools against the 
military dictatorship in El Salvador in the 1980s. Martin-Baro believed that 
such tools could be mobilised to give voice to dissent. For Martin-Baro, 
neopositivist methods could be very useful once separated from their 
epistemological assumptions.  
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Samuel (2014) suggests that statistics can be used as a weapon to 
allow and resist coercion. While the quantitative data generated from HE audit 
practices are problematic, Samuel (2014) notes that practices of quantifying 
people’s experiences can also help to reveal injustice. In such an outlook, 
calculative infrastructures can be organised to make surfaces or planes for 
action and resistance (Lury and Gross, 2014). Statactivism has been 
articulated as a militant use of figures (Baudot, 2014) whereby previous 
representations of reality can be challenged and contested (Bruno et al 2014). 
And although statistics, and the metrics through which they are produced, 
have long been associated with the regressive social accounting practices of 
the neoliberal state (Bruno et al 2014), forms of collective action that use 
numbers, measurements, and indicators as means of denunciation and 
criticism allow the capacity of previous indicators to be brought into doubt 
(Lury and Gross, 2014).  
Such a statactivist approach might hold value in the UK HE context by 
extending the public gaze beyond the narrow metrics of HE whose ideological 
and conceptual limitations leave them heaving helplessly under the strain of 
representing a complex and contested public education sector. This project 
seeks to build on the central premises of statactivist approaches to knowledge 
development and activism in order to address what Lynch and Ivancheva 
(2015) describe as the failure of academics as individuals, and universities as 
corporate bodies, to challenge the spread of market values and new 
managerialism in HE. That is, to take Lynch and Ivancheva (2015) up on their 
challenge to publicly name the ways in which organisational strangulation and 
the lack of resourcing of teaching and research can, and are, distorting 
academic ideals, to reawaken old but much-needed conversations about what 
universities should be for (Savigny, 2013). 
Ingold (2017) said that HE in the UK is beset on all sides by closed and 
self-righteous fundamentalisms, be they religious, political or economic. As 
such, academics cannot wait for university leaders to rise to a challenge they 
don’t recognise. This project seeks to address this dilemma by developing a 
different way of thinking about accountability that restores trust and autonomy 
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through alternative forms of measuring what is happening in UK HE (Craig et 
al 2014). Burton and Gomez Ordonez lament the way that ‘the understanding 
of our reality ends up mediated by what schemata designed in other worlds 
can capture’ (2009: 349). The UK HE Senior Management Survey (SMS) 
represents the first nationwide attempt to understand the realities of UK HE 
through schemata designed within the sector. 
 
SMS survey rationale, method, sample 
A group of lecturers in the UK started this action research project to 
explore the direction of HE management and evaluate different accountability 
measures. Despite the increasing visibility of the National Student Survey 
(NSS)5, there is much that students don't know about the many factors that 
set the context for the experiences that they have. We launched the UK HE 
Senior Management Survey (SMS) as a tool for academic staff around the UK 
to assess, reflect on and comment on the practices of their senior managers. 
The survey sought to move the gaze from the narrow metrics of staff 
performance to the senior management teams who set the conditions through 
which staff performance becomes possible. In so doing it aimed to ask 
questions of the current trajectory of HE in the UK and to broaden debate 
about what universities should and could be for our students.  
The survey mirrors the NSS process and was designed to produce a 
national league table of senior management teams (reproduced below). The 
project was granted ethical approval through the standard ethical approval 
process at the University of Brighton. The online survey, hosted at 
https://smsproject.wordpress.com/about/, consisted of 30 questions (see 
appendix 1) using Likert scales (strongly agree to strongly disagree) mirroring 
 
5 The NSS is an annual survey of final year UK HE undergraduates. 
Commissioned by the Office for Students on behalf of the UK university 
funding and regulatory bodies, the survey is administered by Ipsos MORI, a 
private polling company. See the NSS website at 
https://www.thestudentsurvey.com/ for further information regarding the 
survey and questions used.  
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the NSS focus on satisfaction, whilst also including a series of measures to 
assess:   
-senior management impact on students 
-senior management performance 
-work pressure and wellbeing 
-treatment of staff 
The questions were developed by a team of social scientists from 
around the UK and distributed online via: 
- a targeted UCU email to all members 
- UCU contacts in every university 
- The Times Higher Education website6  
5888 academic staff from across the UK completed the survey, which 
ran between January and May 2017. The survey is necessarily self-selecting 
(like the NSS). However, we have sought to recruit as widely as possible and 
have in some cases managed to achieve substantial numbers of staff in 
individual institutions. We included universities in the final results if we had a 
minimum of 25 academic staff who took part; from this 78 universities were 
included in the final analysis and construction of the league table. In practice 
most universities had considerably more respondents than this and some 
universities had several hundred staff participating. We hope that, with further 
support with future iterations of the survey, we will achieve much higher 
response rates which will allow us to include all UK universities.  
Psychometric analysis of the scales used for the tables show strong 
internal consistency, lending credence to the combined measures. All 
subscales had a Cronbach’s alpha of .75 or above indicating acceptable to 
good internal consistency (see Appendix 2). 
 
 
6 THE also reported on the initial findings of the SMS in October 2017 at 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/survey-results-confirm-uk-
university-staffs-deep-dissatisfaction  
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Results 
The survey responses were used in two ways. Firstly, a league table of 
senior management teams was compiled from the quantitative data7. 
Secondly, the 2,400 qualitative ‘write in’ comments that were collected were 
analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006); seven major 
themes emerged from this process. The seven major themes were: the 
dominance and brutality of metrics; excessive workload; governance, 
accountability and HE ‘fantasy football’; perpetual change and the loss of 
institutional memory; vanity projects; the silenced academic; and work as a 
mental health hazard. As highlighted in the literature presented, the 
dominance of metrics, and excessive workload have been covered in existent 
literature, therefore this paper will focus on the five themes that to date have 
received little attention. Firstly however, we shall present the quantitative 
league tables to give an account of the extent of discontent amongst staff in 
UK HE institutions.  
Quantitative results: the league table 
Mean satisfaction across the sector is 10.54% of university staff 
satisfied with their senior management. The highest institution scored 36.6% 
and the lowest 0%. 
Position  University Percentage of staff satisfied with how 
their university is being managed 
1 University of Oxford 36.60% 
2 Anglia Ruskin University 35.00% 
3 Durham University 31.10% 
4 The University of York 26.20% 
5 University of Strathclyde 25.50% 
6 Manchester Metropolitan 
University 
25.00% 
7 Goldsmiths, University of 
London 
24.30% 
8 University of Bath 23.10% 
9 The University of Warwick 23.00% 
 
7 The quantitative data was initially compiled into four subscales: staff dignity, 
senior management impact on students, senior management performance, 
wellbeing and work pressure.  
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10 Bath Spa University 21.20% 
11 Loughborough University 20.00% 
12 Nottingham Trent University 19.50% 
13 Leeds Beckett University 19.40% 
14 University of Exeter 19.20% 
15 University of Wales Trinity 
Saint David 
16.00% 
16 Newcastle University 15.40% 
17 The University of Edinburgh 14.70% 
18 Aberystwyth 13.50% 
19 London South Bank 
University 
13.40% 
20 Plymouth University 13.30% 
21 St Mary's University, 
Twickenham 
13.20% 
22 University of Portsmouth 13.20% 
23 University of Huddersfield 12.90% 
24 University of Leeds 12.50% 
25 University of Central 
Lancashire 
12.00% 
26 University of 
Wolverhampton 
11.90% 
27 University of Bristol 11.50% 
28 University of Essex 11.10% 
29 University of Roehampton 11.00% 
30 The University of Sheffield 10.70% 
31 University of the West of 
England 
10.40% 
32 Liverpool John Moores 
University 
10.30% 
33 University of Liverpool 10.20% 
34 Sheffield Hallam University 9.80% 
35 Bournemouth University 9.40% 
36 University of Greenwich 9.10% 
37 University of Cumbria 9.00% 
38 University of Glasgow 8.30% 
39 Ulster University 8.10% 
40 SOAS, University of London 8.00% 
41 University of Bradford 8.00% 
42 University of Salford 8.00% 
43 University of East Anglia 7.90% 
44 Cardiff University 7.70% 
45 University of Kent 6.90% 
46 Heriot-Watt University 6.70% 
47 Southampton Solent 
University 
6.60% 
48 Teesside University 6.50% 
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49 Oxford Brookes University 6.10% 
50 University of Bedfordshire 6.00% 
51 University of South Wales 5.90% 
52 The University of 
Nottingham 
5.80% 
53 University of Southampton 5.80% 
54 University of Sussex 5.80% 
55 King's College London 5.70% 
56 Northumbria University 5.40% 
57 The University of 
Manchester 
5.30% 
58 University of Reading 5.20% 
59 University College London 5.10% 
60 University of Leicester 5.10% 
61 Leeds Trinity University 5.00% 
62 University of Brighton 4.80% 
63 City University London 4.70% 
64 University of Birmingham 4.50% 
65 Swansea University 3.80% 
66 University of Hertfordshire 3.80% 
67 University of Aberdeen 3.60% 
68 Birmingham City University 3.30% 
69 De Montfort University 3.10% 
70 Coventry University 2.40% 
71 Kingston University 2.30% 
72 University of Surrey 2.20% 
73 London Metropolitan 
University 
1.70% 
74 Open University 1.70% 
75 Queen's University Belfast 1.50% 
76 The University of Hull 0% 
77 University of Chester 0% 
78 University of Westminster 0% 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the league table is that three 
institutions scored a flat 0% satisfaction rating. It would be useful if we could 
identify some shared characteristics of these institutions, but it is difficult to 
see any. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any trends in the league table in terms 
of geographic location, membership of the Russell Group or even general 
‘status’ of universities.  There is no pattern of, for example, more research-
intensive universities appearing at the top or the bottom of the league table, 
nor metropolitan universities scoring higher, or lower, than provincial 
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universities. Post-92 institutions fare no better or worse than ‘old’ universities.  
The only conclusion that we can draw is that the competence of senior 
managers is distributed randomly across the sector, and staff in any particular 
institution may simply be lucky or otherwise to have a good management 
team or a poor one. Judging by these results UK HE staff are more likely than 
not to encounter a poor senior management team.  
 
Findings 
Governance, accountability and HE ‘fantasy football’ 
Throughout the corpus of data staff commented at length on what they felt 
was an injustice in terms of accountability in HE institutions. As the following 
participant commented: 
 
We hold students accountable (through marking and attendance 
monitoring), students hold us accountable (through teaching 
evaluations and NSS), senior management holds us accountable. Why 
do we not get to evaluate senior management in the same way 
students get to evaluate us, and why can't these necessary metrics 
carry at least some weight?  
 
Here this participant understands their experience of the current situation in 
HE institutions through the broad concept of accountability as a process 
through which individuals (both staff and students) are held responsible for 
their actions through notions of answerability and enforceability (Gaventa and 
McGee, 2013), in this case the NSS, teaching evaluations, attendance 
monitoring and marking. Interestingly however, rather than being resistant and 
critical of the metric culture (Beer, 2016, Smyth 2017) this participant calls out 
the inequity of a metric surveillance system that overlooks senior 
management. The lack of evaluation and accountability of the senior 
management is reminiscent of Holmwood et al’s (2016) assertion that senior 
management teams are self-selecting and self-governing boards with 
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unlimited power, and the self-governing characteristics of such boards result 
in the chain of accountability ending with them.  
 
This dichotomy between staff and senior management, whereby staff are 
subjected to an increase in accountability and performance measurements, 
whilst senior management teams are perceived to be accountable to fewer 
metrics and layers of accountability is central to the following participant’s 
understanding: 
 
The University sector is not in good shape and senior management is 
never held accountable for this. Universities are meant to be places of 
learning where knowledge claims based on evidence are subject to 
testing and critique. However, the performance regimes in place in 
universities actually reduce the quality of teaching and research - that 
these systems are still clung to shows management to be a faith rather 
than evidence-based enterprise.  
 
In the above extract the participant draws on the notion of ‘faith’ to suggest 
that lack of evidence-based enterprise and decision making by senior 
management at HE institutions. Explicit within this understanding is the sense 
that a system of evidence, checks, critique and ultimately accountability are 
no longer present in the functioning of decision making at HE institutions, 
despite being central to the teaching, learning and knowledge production at 
universities being built on these principles. Thus Ridley’s (2017) suggestion 
that managerial predation and excessive risk taking are a result of the lack of 
good governance underpinned by a system of accountability seems pertinent 
within our participants understandings. Further, it is not just the lack of 
accountability of senior management that is resulting in the sector not being 
‘in good shape’ but also this participant understands the ‘performance 
regimes’ enforced on staff as a central cause of a reduction in the quality of 
staff teaching and research, a position echoing Gulbrandsen’s (2008) 
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argument that ‘accountability recipes’ are often counterproductive and result 
in a drop in standards.  
 
Whilst the above could be understood as the active dismissal of accountability 
in senior management regimes via the self-selecting and self-governing 
structures in place at the top of universities, the following extracts highlight 
how the lack of accountability and poor management tactics might be more a 
result of a lack of understanding. For example: 
 
At heart the problem is one of governance. Academic staff ultimately 
do not run the university. It is run by a small group of senior 
administrators with little idea about running a university. This leads to a 
lot of "initiatives" that detract from the day job of teaching, revising 
curricula, and doing research. "Initiatives" like a curriculum refresh are 
more about box ticking and buzzwords than any serious review of 
curriculum. 
 
University managers are playing fantasy football with the institution: 
they know nothing about how it actually works and spend their time 
obsessing about data that is poorly collected and badly interpreted. 
 
The senior managers I am sure work very hard in ways they perceive 
to generally be in the best interests of employees and the institution.  I 
would not want their job.  But I believe they ought to know more about 
what they are purporting to manage, and not rely on performance 
indicators and the quasi-anonymous process of cascading down 
information.  They might manage, but don't lead.  As a consequence, 
they assume their right to lead, rather than earning it.   
 
Here we see accounts of the decline in democratic input and representation of 
staff in university governance systems (MacFarlane 2007). Throughout these 
accounts accountability for poor decision making is understood through the 
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construction of a void between the knowledge and experience of senior 
management teams, and ‘what they are purporting to manage’. Rather than 
being academic staff that have worked their way up the chain of command 
and earnt a right to lead, ‘senior administrators’ are ‘playing fantasy football’ 
with universities. The shift from a collegial to a bureaucratic and hierarchical 
managerial culture (Rustin, 2016) results in academic staff no longer 
collectively influencing decision making (Holmwood et al, 2016): rather, 
permanent managers rely on poor data and ‘initiatives’ to enforce a 
hierarchical authority (Gill, 2009) through a vocabulary of knowledge that 
legitimises managerial power (Craig et al 2014).  
 
Perpetual change and the loss of institutional memory 
Linked to the disconnect between senior managers and university staff 
(Barnett 2003; Collini 2012; Docherty 2015) was a persistent sense that a lack 
of understanding of what research and teaching in HE entails coupled with the 
desire to make the university ‘better’ results in constant change and 
uncertainty. As the following participants state:  
 
We have had a re-organisation (a very expensive one), which effectively 
separates the teaching and research functions, as well as academic and 
non-academic functions.  It means that no-one is looking to see how well-
balanced these are at an individual level. 
 
Frankly the context of constant rudderless change and endlessly growing 
bureaucracy in HE means that they end up exposing us to a process of 
continuous revolution which erodes staff well-being, rarely benefits 
students' learning, and undermines grassroots creativity. 
 
Change, uncertainty and restructuring are central to the participants’ 
understanding and are certainly not seen as something positive throughout 
our data. Here we see ‘re-organisation’ and ‘rudderless change’ presented as 
the objects of staff dissatisfaction and poor outcomes for students. Indeed, 
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these participants understand such change regimes in a similar light to the 
accounts in the section above highlighting the lack of understanding of what it 
is to work on the frontline of HE in the UK by senior management. Thus we 
see accounts that present change and re-organisation as vehicles for the 
deep and arguably widening divisions between university staff and their senior 
management teams (e.g. Nash, 2019). This is rather succinctly expressed by 
the following participant: 
 
Senior management needs to listen to 'the people on the ground' in order 
to understand the impact of the changes that they make. 
 
Throughout our corpus of data it was clear that academic staff could see local 
changes linked to national changes imposed by the government, the change 
in fee structure being one of the most prominent. For example: 
  
Reorganisation has been clumsy, heavy handed and officious. I feel 
less a lecturer than a shoe-fitter, such is the overwhelming rush to 
make students customers. I am sick of the phrase 'the student 
experience'. It is demoralising, this endless and toxic top-down micro-
management. The university is in the dark ages. It is a systemically 
mean spirited place, kept afloat by those dedicated admin and teaching 
staff who are conscientious. 
 
In this extract we see the implicit reference to the change in student fees and 
the marketization of HE represented through reference to ‘student customers’ 
and ‘the student experience’ (Nixon, Scullion, and Hearn, 2018). Thus, there 
is recognition that local changes are part of a broader change agenda in UK 
HE yet the apparent ‘clumsy, heavy handed and officious’ nature of how local 
changes are implemented and handled becomes the object for staff 
dissatisfaction and demoralisation. Such an understanding once again 
constructs and reinforces the division between ‘those dedicated admin and 
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teaching staff’ and the ‘toxic top-down micro-management’ practices of senior 
management teams (Barnett 2003; Collini 2012; Docherty 2015).  
 
Such examples of the negative impact of change featured throughout our data 
and was often understood in terms of staffing cuts implemented under the 
guise of ‘re-organisation’, resulting in considerable increases in workloads for 
the staff that remain, and also as a loss of institutional identity or ‘institutional 
memory’ due to the departure of senior and long standing members of 
departments/institutions and the broader McDonaldization of HE in the UK 
(Garland, 2019). These themes are clearly expressed in the following 
comments:  
 
Since a new senior manager was appointed in my department, a number 
of significant changes to my established working patterns have been 
imposed on me. The consultation process during these changes has been 
very limited, i.e. my job specification was changed without any consultation 
with me, and an increase in the number of contact teaching hours of more 
than 50% has been imposed. 
 
 The department I work in has seen most of the senior teaching and 
research staff, including all but one professor, leave by taking early 
retirement packages. This means that cheaper and less experienced 
hourly-paid and part-time staff are bearing greater and greater 
responsibilities for teaching and curriculum development. We have lost our 
'institutional memory'. 
 
Vanity projects  
Linked to the broader changes in the culture of UK HE senior management 
teams was an understanding in which senior managers, and Vice Chancellors 
more specifically, were misusing funds to embark on various capital projects, 
or as some commented ‘vanity projects’. As the following notes: 
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My view is that senior management at many HE institutions pursue a 
macho agenda of expansion for expansion's sake, involving huge 
expenditure on buildings and other signifiers of status, and pay for 
much of it by exploiting the overseas student market. 
 
In this extract the observation that senior management teams ‘pursue a 
macho agenda’ not for the benefit of staff and students but for ‘signifiers of 
status’ is similar to Perry and Miller’s (2017) representation of university 
senior managers as sociopathic leaders befuddled by a combination of 
narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism. Indeed, through the pursuit of 
‘expansion for expansion’s sake’ this participant understands the actions of 
their senior managers as a selfish and ambitious pursuit (see also Craig et al., 
2014) which ‘exploits’ the recent move to international student recruitment 
across many UK HE institutions. Such a pursuit can be likened to the ‘macho’ 
agenda of high-class car marketing whereby fast cars are presented as 
identity symbols through notions of hegemonic masculinity (Hirschman, 2016). 
In similar vein, the following participant observes exploitation of the income 
generated by student fees to engage on capital projects. They comment: 
 
It is disgraceful that university management 'top slice' the money young 
people pay for their education to spend on their own vanity projects.  
 
In addition to the misuse of student fees to embark on such projects, other 
participants noted that the direct fall out of over ambitious ‘vanity projects’ was 
a lack of funding for more basic aspects of university functioning. For 
example, as one participant suggests:  
 
Senior Management at my university is appalling. In order to support a 
vanity project at my university staff are put under unbearable pressure. 
SM are driving staff to resign, take voluntary severance, or seek other 
posts because there is no support for research, or to deliver good 
quality teaching. 
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Here a direct link of causality is offered up between senior management 
vanity projects and ‘no support for research, or to deliver good quality 
teaching’. This appears to resonate with some of our earlier analysis which 
highlighted how the ‘student as consumer’ has shaped decision making in HE 
institutions over recent years. In this sense, the capital projects can be 
understood through the desire for the ‘student experience’ to be realised 
through experiences with space which represents something akin to 
purchasing the latest Apple Mac in an official Apple store whereby the 
consumer experience is increasingly sanitised, predictable and McDonaldized 
(Manolia, Winsor and Kelley, 2015). The result of this ‘consumer experience’ 
is a workforce facing ‘unbearable pressure’ resulting in an inability to deliver 
‘good quality’ teaching and research, arguably the two elements central to the 
work of universities (and indeed the national REF and TEF assessments). 
Such expansion strategies were understood as overwhelmingly negative 
across the data set and once again highlight the perceived void between 
academic staff and senior management teams, as the following highlight:  
 
 The management is currently obsessed with spending money on new 
buildings; this is soaking up huge amounts of the University's budget on 
flashy buildings that are often unfit for purpose. 
 
Raising large amounts of money to build more posh buildings but cutting 
back on staff appointments to pay the additional costs involved. I no longer 
have any confidence in our senior team. Buildings and vanity projects are 
all they believe in. 
 
The silenced academic  
Some have highlighted the failure of the academic community to embrace its 
freedom and fight back at the types of oppressive structures highlighted in the 
above analysis (Halffman and Radder, 2015). Our data shows that the reality 
of speaking out is somewhat different from the idealised version of freedom 
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and creative expression in Universities (Wallerstein, 2006). As the following 
participant comments: 
 
Supposed increases in transparency and consultation by senior managers 
are undermined by their deliberate increase in feelings of job insecurity, 
such that staff no longer provide info on consultations for fear of 
retribution. 
 
In this extract it is clear that the nationwide situation of precarious and 
insecure contracts facilitates a silencing of academic freedom. Whilst the 
notion of a ‘community of scholars’ is still widely held in UK HE (Docherty 
2015: 23), in this account, that community of scholars no longer has the ability 
to exercise its collective voice to challenge decisions through the 
‘transparency’ and ‘consultation’ mechanisms offered by senior managers. 
Collective voice is systemically deconstructed through the imposition of 
targets, performance criteria, precarity and homogenised systems for 
assessing research and teaching performance (Edmond, 2017). Fear of 
individual retribution functions to silence the contemporary academic from 
challenging policy and strategy within HE settings and can be understood in a 
similar light to the strategy Margret Thatcher’s government adopted in 
aggressively ‘taming’ the trade unions in the 1970/80’s (Hanson, 2016). 
 
Whilst the above extract highlights the subtle ways in which staff silencing 
occurs through the individualisation of the UK HE sector via a range of 
strategies including individual targets and precarious employment, our data 
also offered many examples of more blatant and explicit silencing practices. 
For example: 
 
Increasingly an environment where disagreement is not tolerated, where 
policies that we don't think are wise can't be argued against, and 
autocratic management designed to please the senior executive and not 
help or protect staff is preferred. Members of staff who are awkward and 
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have strong views that aren't welcome are in danger of being made 
'redundant' when they are not redundant (as has happened in one case 
that I know of). 
 
Here we see an account in which senior managers are argued to be far more 
active in the silencing of staff. In this account ‘disagreement is not tolerated’ 
and to silence disagreement employment security (or lack of) is used as a tool 
to control dissenting opinions. Such an account echo’s the concerns of Lynch 
and Ivancheva (2015) who suggest that the HE elite can, and regularly does, 
limit academic freedom by sanctioning dissent. Thus, it appears that such 
hardline managerialism systematically deconstructs the space through which 
professional autonomy and freedom of expression, two things argued to be 
symbolic of universities (Docherty, 2015), are exercised (Olssen and Peters, 
2005). Therefore, far from the mythical story of the university promoting 
creativity in a community of scholars (Barnett 2003; Collini 2012; Smyth 
2017), senior management at universities appear to be enforcing a system 
more akin to a dictatorship enforcing compliance rather than critique, as the 
following participant articulately states:  
 
People keep disappearing in a most macabre way. It is like living through 
Stalin's purges.  I think this university is going to have a severe problem 
recruiting given the way it treats its existing faculty. 
 
Work as a mental health hazard  
Our final theme – work as a mental health hazard – is perhaps the most 
troubling. Implicated here are the four themes that precede it, accountability, 
change, capital projects and the resulting silencing of the academic, which 
impact on staff wellbeing and mental health. For example, as one participant 
highlights:  
 
Over the past couple of years my anxiety levels have reached critical to the 
extent that I literally find it hard to breathe. I often wake in the early hours 
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and can't go back to sleep because of having to make notes about things 
I've forgotten to do at work. New management at faculty level since 
September uses crude face to face teaching hours as a measure of 
workload and tells me mine is too low. It's Saturday morning and I'm sitting 
in front of a computer doing work. 
 
In this extract the mental health impacts faced by academics at UK HE 
institutions are laid bare. Far from the ‘myth’ of the university (e.g. Wallerstein, 
2006) highlighted earlier in which academic freedom, knowledge 
advancement and generally a progressive environment were seen to 
symbolise HE institutions, it appears academics are faced with something in 
stark contrast to these representations; a toxic environment which often  
manifests through characteristics of generalised anxiety disorder (e.g. 
struggling to sleep and breathe). Linked to a ‘new management’ regime and 
implicitly associated with the restructuring of workloads, this participant falls 
foul of the problematic distribution of resources highlighted earlier in this 
analysis and the difficultly to ‘switch off’ from work due to modern working 
contexts and technologies (Sonnentag and Bayer, 2005).  
 
In addition to the allocation of resources and change at work resulting in 
negative wellbeing impacts for staff, others highlighted how this links to the 
ever-increasing silencing of academics mentioned above, as the following 
notes:  
 
Not surprising then, the number of staff with mental health problems in my 
department (but also within the university at large) and colleagues 
expressing signs of exhaustion has soared in recent years. All this of 
course is nothing to be discussed openly as it would bring the department 
or university into disrepute.  
 
Here then, not only are staff experiencing mental health difficulties faced with 
the general negative stigma surrounding mental health disclosure in the work 
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place (e.g. Krupa et al., 2009) but they appear to be experiencing further 
silencing due to fears of bringing ‘the department or university into disrepute’, 
presumably something which senior managers are keen to avoid.  
 
Whilst these examples could be seen as unfortunate and unplanned 
outcomes of broader processes of change and adaptation in a shifting HE 
landscape, prominent throughout the data set were examples of more pre-
planned, potentially premeditated examples of senior management having a 
negative impact on staff wellbeing and mental health. The two following 
comments provide clear examples: 
 
I have seen senior management break junior staff down to serious 
psychological illnesses with their extended probation times and shifting 
goals. I am only glad that I joined before that came in- now, I am just 
waiting for my child to change schools and I will leave the country. Nothing 
is worth this stress. This University is inhumane. 
 
Senior management seem distant and uncaring. They have created a 
disillusioned and despondent workforce. 
 
In both of these extracts a far more cynical account is offered up in terms of 
the relationship between senior management and staff. Drawing on tropes of 
‘inhumane’, ‘distant’ and ‘uncaring’, senior management are presented as a 
group of individuals who are not passively inflicting negative staff wellbeing 
impacts via broader institutional change and uncertainly. Rather in these 
accounts they are presented as a group of individuals who ‘break junior staff 
down to serious psychological illness’ and create a ‘disillusioned and 
despondent workforce’ through enforcing a suffocating array of audit 
assemblages (Spooner, 2017), which are largely unachievable due to the 
‘shifting goals’. Thus academic staff and particularly newly hired lecturers on 
‘extended probation times’ are under excessive and unreasonable pressure to 
achieve more with increased contractual insecurity (Lynch and Ivancheva, 
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2015). The culture of silence highlighted above appears to hide the extent of 
‘stress’, ‘psychological illness’, ‘disillusionment’ and precariousness, pressure 
and exhaustion amongst university staff (Berg et al. 2016). 
 
The health and wellbeing impact of such experiences is summarised in the 
following extract which highlights the negativity and helplessness of the HE 
workforce: 
 
I have a long-term health condition and working here has made my 
problems significantly worse.  Every day is a painful misery due to this, 
and I don't know how much longer I can take it.  Increasingly I feel that 
the last 15 years of my life have been a waste, and that academia in this 
country is irreparably broken. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
Fine (2018) argues that there is an increasing need to interrogate how 
evidence has been deployed to legitimate the hollowing out and colonisation 
of public institutions. As our data suggests, this is especially crucial for a UK 
HE sector characterised as being eaten alive by corporate logic and relentless 
metrics of punitive accountability. However, when surveying the academic 
literature on the demise of the public university it is difficult not to be struck by 
the surfeit of progressive injunctions for change resting on a deficit of concrete 
plans to action these injunctions for change.  
 
Halffman and Radder (2015) and Martell (2017) suggest that university 
colonisation is a success because  academics have cooperated en masse 
whereby critical social scientists write ‘sharp papers’ against the travails of 
managerialism and metrics but then meekly conform to its introduction in their 
own universities, hoping and praying they sit at the bottom of the list when ‘the 
weakest sheep are sent to the slaughter’ (p. 175). Spooner (2017) concurs, 
noting that universities are not innocent victims but knowing accomplices in 
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this savage and capricious managerial domination, and asks whether 
universities actually have the potential to disrupt these hierarchies and 
inequitable power structures. Martell (2017) suggests that academics are 
rather better at criticising the marketisation of society than resisting the 
marketisation of higher education, a point made in the context of the USA in 
Bill Readings’ seminal, and prescient for the UK, The University in Ruins 
(1996). 
 
Despite this, there has been no shortage of suggestions for directions of 
travel from the ‘sharp papers’ published. These include the need for the 
sovereignty of academic boards for financial, pedagogical and organisational 
issues, membership of boards to be elected by a majority of staff and for the 
staff on them to be actively engaged in teaching/research, and governors to 
be elected for 3 year terms (Holmwood et al 2016). Some suggest a need to 
move to accessible institutions that foster critical, creative, engaged 
citizenship while generating public interest research (Spooner, 2017). There 
has been the proposition that all managerial posts should consist of rotated 
academics, not managers, and a need to privilege community research and 
slow scholarship and to re-appropriate concepts of quality and accountability 
while exposing the nature of coercive audit culture (Spooner, 2017). 
Halffmann and Radder (2015) suggest the need for a public university aimed 
at the common good, the need to limit wasteful audit and control systems and 
for no more than 10% of academic time to be spent on administrative 
overheads. They also suggest a ban on mergers and overfunded prestige 
hobbyhorses and argue that all academic members should teach at least 20% 
and a ban on marking (Halffman and Radder, 2015).  
 
However, despite these progressive recommendations we continue to 
experience a dominant culture of theoretical and practical fatalism that has 
largely stopped short of moving beyond sharp words in journal articles. Some 
commentators have noted that this fatalism is not misplaced: ‘the effect of 
these arguments and objections on those who make and implement policies 
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for universities has been … all but invisible’ (Collini 2012: 116). But Collini 
also notes that these objections have ‘won the intellectual argument’. It is 
simply the case that those making policy are not listening to these sharp 
words. Given this, we need to consider other responses, other strategies.  
 
The UK HE Senior Management Survey (SMS) represents the first 
nationwide attempt to understand the realities of UK HE through schemata 
designed within the sector. In so doing it represents an iteration of 
statactivism that moves beyond ‘sharp words’ with a metric oriented to the 
performance of the senior management teams who set the conditions through 
which staff performance becomes possible. The survey mirrors the NSS 
process and produced a national league table of senior management teams to 
intervene in the seeming decline of UK Higher Education, and hence operate 
as a practice of resistance of sorts.  
 
It could be argued that our SMS league table is predictable and is only 
indicative of a lack of engagement and a culture of complaining on the part of 
academic staff. After all, reports of high levels of disquiet with university senior 
managers’ performance preceded this project, and senior managers 
responses were to dismiss these reports.  Former Vice Chancellor Sir David 
Watson, writing on the ‘question of morale’ in HE, identified this some time 
ago: 
“There is a comforting tale that heads of higher education institutions 
(HEIs) like to tell each other. ‘Go around your university or college,’ they 
say, ‘and ask the first ten people who you meet how their morale is. The 
response will always be “rock-bottom.” Then ask them what they are 
working on. The responses will be full of life, of optimism and of 
enthusiasm for the task in hand.’” (Watson 2009) 
However, we disagree with such dismissiveness. In the SMS our very 
extensive qualitative data corroborates and extends our understanding of how 
dramatically and rapidly universities have changed in recent years. Many of 
the narrative accounts we received were stark in their presentation of 
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academic staff in very difficult, stressful, upsetting and sometimes demeaning 
situations And whilst it could be claimed that managers have a right to 
manage, and that senior managers in many universities are innovating and 
changing their institutions in response to external conditions changing 
(notably the introduction of the £9,000 tuition fees regime) we must point to 
the data we collected that shows considerable human health consequences – 
both physical and mental – from these management regimes for so many 
university employees.  
 
The qualitative data that the SMS collected reveals an acute situation of 
endemic bullying and harassment, chronic overwork, high levels of mental 
health problems, general health and wellbeing problems, and catastrophically 
high levels of demoralization and dissatisfaction across the UK HE sector. 
This suggests that a sector that is vitally important for the UK knowledge 
economy is on the edge of potential disaster. For this reason we feel that the 
SMS, if nothing else, is a call to action to demonstrate, and support responses 
to, the woeful state of management and governance in the UK HE sector.  
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Appendix 1: SMS questionnaire 
There were 30 questions in the survey; participants were invited to indication 
their response as one of: 
Definitely agree, mostly agree, neither agree nor disagree, mostly disagree, 
definitely disagree, not applicable.  
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After completing the 30 questions participants were presented with a screen 
which said ‘Please feel free to add any comments’.  
Finally, participants were asked for their university, university role, gender 
identify, age, and ethnicity.  
Questions:  
1. My senior management provide me with the resources necessary to do the 
best job I can for the students 
2. The way that my senior management calculate my working hours leaves 
me sufficient time to support students   
3. My institution gives me enough time to be able to support my students’ 
needs  
4. My senior management positively impacts how I can support my students  
5. I don't get enough time to prepare teaching  
6. I have sufficient time in my workload to prepare good quality student 
feedback 
7. My senior management enables me to support students 
8. NSS and/or module feedback scores are being used to encourage the best 
performance of staff 
9. My senior management allow me freedom to pursue a research agenda 
that I believe is important  
10. My senior managers are sympathetic to the competing pressures of REF 
and student support 
11. The pressure I experience to bring income into my Department negatively 
affects my students 
12. My university enables me to support my local community  
13. We employ staff on zero hour contracts at my university  
14. I believe my senior managers work hard 
15. I believe my senior manages deserve the salaries that they are paid 
16. My senior management have sold university properties/campuses in the 
last five years. 
17. My senior managers are taking steps to reduce the number of staff on 
short term and insecure teaching contracts at my university  
18. To the best of my knowledge, my senior management favour trying to hold 
down tuition fees 
19. Pressure to reach REF and other publication targets negatively affects my 
wellbeing 
20. My senior management provides resources to support my wellbeing at 
work 
21. My working environment is supportive  
22. The physical environment in which I work is unsafe 
23. My working environment has a negative impact on my wellbeing  
24. I feel respected and valued by my senior management  
25. I regularly have to work evenings and/or weekends in order to fulfil my 
academic roles 
26. My senior management supports all employees equitably 
27. My senior management communicates changes effectively 
28. Progression processes are transparent 
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29. I have access to specialised equipment, facilities and rooms when I need 
them 
30. I am satisfied with the way my university is managed 
 
 
Appendix 2: Reliability 
 
1. The staff dignity subscale is internally consistent 	
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.754 .764 6 
 
2. The senior management impact on students subscale is internally 
consistent 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.834 9 
 
3. The senior management’s performance subscale is internally consistent 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.799 .804 4 
 
4. The wellbeing and work pressure subscale is internally consistent 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.769 .768 7 
 
 
 
